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One of the two components of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8 is
“economic growth”, a term which people in the 21st century are quite familiar with. The question
of growth, or the lack thereof, has often featured prominently in political debates, scholarly
writings, as well as popular media. Nevertheless, sustained economic growth was only a recent
phenomenon in human history. The world economy remained stagnant throughout the first 1800
years in the Common Era and started to grow exponentially after that.1 Measured by international
dollars in 1990, the world has seen more than 5 times increase in population in the last two
centuries, but the real GDP has increased by more than 700 times.2
Of course, that growth was not and is not shared evenly across time and space. Nevertheless, it is
fair to argue that economic growth has been a common theme in modern times, that is, the era of
capitalism. As the most important critics of capitalism, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels made the
following praise in 1848: “The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created
more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together.
Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and
agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for
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cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground — what earlier
century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social
labour?”3
The other component of the SDG 8 is “decent work.” This broad term covers different dimensions,
such as employment (paid or unpaid), social protection, workers' rights, and social dialogue.4 It
emerged in the late 1990s in the International Labour Conference.5 The ideas of a decent job and
the struggles around it, however, are probably as old as capitalism and modern economic growth.

Capitalism and economic growth
Capitalism, with its logic of competition and accumulation, is an inherently growth-oriented
system. If modern economic growth is historically associated with capitalism, a related question
is how capitalism first started to develop in the last few hundred years. Although various parts of
the world documented some early signs of the bourgeois class and capitalism, scholars widely
acknowledge that capitalism first made its break-through in Western Europe around 16th century.
There are different opinions as to why and how Western Europe first developed capitalism. Some
writers emphasize the fact that the internal class struggles between serfs and lords have
successfully weakened the feudal system, which eventually made the rise of capitalist commerce
and agriculture possible.6 Other writers focus more on the external factors such as the rise of longdistance trade and towns, as well as the immense financial, political, and ecological benefits
associated with overseas expansion and colonialization.7 Here the external factors cease to be
external once we consider the world economy as a whole and the rise of Western Europe as one
outcome of the world labor division under the creation of the world capitalist system. Moreover,
scholars have argued that due to damages from colonialization, unfair division of labor, and
unequal exchange, the development in the West had caused underdevelopment in the third world.8
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On a more concrete level, economic growth has been driven by capital accumulation. And
industrial revolution and the subsequent waves of industrialization are the most important
examples of capital accumulation. Scholars have offered a range of different explanations for the
causes of industrialization and growth. Many of these efforts, unfortunately, are not satisfactory.
An old and often criticized view focuses on the role of culture. Max Weber provided a popular
version of this idea, arguing that protestant ethics encouraged people to work and accumulate,
which led to the rise of capitalism.9 The culture perspective not only often relies on stereotypical
and Eurocentric understanding of non-European societies, but it also has great difficulties in
explaining different economic outcomes among regions or countries with similar religions or
cultures. Another popular explanation involves the influence of natural conditions, such as natural
resources, geography, and temperature (see Chapter 15). For example, warmer weather, lack of
access to ports, and even rich natural resources have been used to explain the lack of development
in Africa and other third-world countries. But clearly, countries in warm weather such as Singapore
have developed well, and colder weather only ceased to be a major constraint on people's working
capacity in Northern countries due to better infrastructure and higher income.10 And for any such
suggested causes, it is easy to identify rich countries where these factors also exist (lack of ports
or resource abundance).
And finally, some scholars also emphasize the role of institutions and argue certain types of
institutions induce economic growth while others prohibit economic growth. While this
explanation offers a more fruitful analysis, its limitation is also obvious. Many economists, for
example, like to mention the importance of secure private property and less taxation. Research has
shown, however, such institutional arrangements were not present when economic growth first
started in countries that are now rich today.11 Moreover, it is not clear at all whether secure private
property relations or free markets are prerequisites for economic growth. The US has benefited
from its long tradition of industrial policy and high tariffs before reaching dominance in the world
market. 12 The Soviet Union achieved long periods of rapid economic growth with economic
planning. And China in the last few decades has had huge economic successes without a
completely free market and fully secure private properties.
There was optimism among some economists, especially those in the neoclassical tradition, that
economic growth will cease to be an issue in the long term. For example, in the standard Solow
model, countries with different starting levels of capital stocks will eventually converge to the
same level of per capita capital stocks. Thus poor countries tend to grow faster, while richer
countries tend to grow slower. It is as if every market economy has a guaranteed happy ending
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without a need for state policies. This so-called convergence thesis has generated much debate in
the field, and the existing evidence is strongly against it.13
To move beyond these explanations, we need to go back to the root of capital accumulation. In
any society, the resources available to be invested after meeting the essential social consumption
needs can be called the economic surplus following Paul Baran. The central question of economic
growth is how much of the economic surplus can and will be invested. Baran convincingly argues
that even poor countries still have considerable economic surplus beyond the national essential
consumption, and the way ruling classes use the economic surplus determines the potential of
economic growth. 14 For example, The Japanese government in the late 19th century strongly
encouraged investment in railway construction, shipbuilding, education among other things which
enabled Japan to start catching up with the Western industrial nations.15 This is the reason Keynes
and the post-Keynesian have placed much importance on the capitalists' investment decisions (or
investment functions) and coined the term "animal spirit" to describe the connection between
expected profits and planned investment.
What then affects the utilization of economic surplus or the Baran ratio? 16 One of the most
important factors is the function of the state, either through industrial policy or more
comprehensive planning. One may recall the early discussions on the so-called vicious circle of
poverty or poverty traps. In a poor country, self-sustained growth can be extremely hard to achieve.
From the supply side, poor countries, in general, have lower savings and a low level of science
and technology. From the demand side, poor countries often have limited market and purchasing
power. Since the externalities prevail in the economy, a new business may not be viable unless
there is a range of related industries developing at the same time. All this essentially means that
leaving to itself, the market economy is unlikely to break these constraints, and some strong
government intervention and planning are indispensable to modern economic growth. Indeed, the
role of the state was obvious in all the late developers such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet
Union, and later examples like South Korea and China.
Whether the governments are willing and able to play such an important role is, of course, subject
to concrete historical conditions. In some cases, the ruling class and its political elites are not
interested in domestic industrial development because their interests are based on or closely related
to non-industrial activities: mining, plantation, and most importantly, trading these raw materials
or tropical products. This was the case with much of Latin America from 17th century to 19th
century which was buried deeply in the colonial economic system as a raw material producer and
correspondingly developed forms of bonded labor and plantations. It was also the case with much
13
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of the US south, where the ruling class was content with exporting cotton to Britain with slave
labor. It was only the US north, which was largely neglected in the process, partly due to its
unfavorable condition for mining and plantations, that the local capitalist class had an interest in
developing its own industries before the abolition of slavery.17 The anti-accumulation/reactionary
characteristics of the capitalist class were common in the former colonies and semi-colonies.
Sometimes called the compradors, these elites serve as the local connections for the colonial and
imperialist powers.
Even if the governments happen to have the willingness to push for growth and industrialization,
they cannot always do so. The more progressive wing of the capitalist class in the third world, or
the national bourgeoisie, was certainly more interested in growth and accumulation. They were,
however, in general quite weak economically and politically, and unable to carry out antiimperialist and anti-feudal struggles to develop national industries and national markets. It is
important to note that, very often the national governments cannot better facilitate economic
growth because of the collation between domestic and foreign interests. The long history of
colonialism and imperialism has illustrated this point well. When countries started to implement
reforms, they often face a hostile external environment. This was the case in Guatemala, Chile,
Indonesia, and others where progressive governments were overthrown in bloody coups with US
involvement. And countries such as Cuba still face sanctions today.
Success in implementing radical changes can set a country on a long course of economic growth.
The Chinese government for a long time in the Republican era, for example, was controlled by the
Guomindang (Nationalist Party) which had close connections with the landlords. Although they
had plans of land reform, they failed to implement them due to opposition from landed interests.
It was only the revolutionary government led by the Chinese Communist Party later that was able
to carry out nationwide comprehensive land reform. The effect of such radical changes can have a
major impact on the growth potentials of a country. Following the 1949 revolution and land reform,
the Chinese government achieved a dramatic increase in capital accumulation and growth by
eliminating unnecessary elite consumption and waste. The per capita income in China was about
the same in 1933 and 1953, but the saving rate increased from merely 1.7 percent in 1933 to 20
percent in 1953.18 The Chinese government maintained its tradition of high accumulation persisted
even after its transition into a market economy since the 1980s. Measured by the Baran ratio, China
consistently spent more than 80 percent of its economic surplus on capital accumulation, which
has been the basis of the sustained rapid growth in the last four decades.19
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Early struggles for decent work
The transition from feudalism to capitalism generated the modern issue of unemployment. This
transition to capitalism happened at different times in different places. In the countryside, different
paths of agrarian change gradually sent people off the rural land. The newly formed urban working
class did not have the tradition-protected job tenures and customary rights to certain public
resources. Many of the new urban population became either unemployed or semi-unemployed.
Calling these people the "relative surplus population" or "reserve army of labor", Karl Marx
categorized them into three groups: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant.20 The floating refers
to those workers who routinely get hired and fired, following the business cycles. The latent means
the rural migrants who were driven out of capitalist agriculture, while the stagnant describes those
with highly irregular employment. Besides these, vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, and the like
constitute the lowest layer of the reserve army. Marx argues that capitalism will never provide
decent work to the entire working class, as "The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital,
the extent and energy of its growth, and, therefore, also the absolute mass of the proletariat and the
productiveness of its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army.”21
For those who were lucky enough to have relatively stable employment, the conditions were not
much better. They had to work for extremely long hours in harsh conditions and receive little pay.
Children labor were prevalent and they worked as long as 15 hours a day. The low nutritional
intake, the high intensity of work, and the overall bad health conditions even had a visible impact
on how tall people could grow. Marx as well as recent economic historians have all documented a
marked degeneration in human stature (and so was the general health) in the first decades of the
19th century.22 Engels’ vivid description of the working conditions of the English working class in
the 1840s is worth quoting at length:
“In many rooms of the cotton and flax-spinning mills, the air is filled with fibrous dust,
which produces chest affections, especially among workers in the carding and combingrooms. Some constitutions can bear it, some cannot; but the operative has no choice. He
must take the room in which he finds work, whether his chest is sound or not. The most
common effects of this breathing of dust are blood-spitting, hard, noisy breathing, pains in
the chest, coughs, sleeplessness – in short, all the symptoms of asthma ending in the worst
cases in consumption. Especially unwholesome is the wet spinning of linen-yarn which is
carried on by young girls and boys. The water spurts over them from the spindle, so that
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the front of their clothing is constantly wet through to the skin; and there is always water
standing on the floor.” 23
Industrialization, a core element of modern economic growth, was a crucial factor that deteriorated
the conditions of the English working class. Before industrialization, workers still enjoyed a
considerable degree of autonomy and did the work at home such as spinning and weaving while
facing not much competition. In Engels' words, "So the workers vegetated throughout a passably
comfortable existence, leading a righteous and peaceful life in all piety and probity; and their
material position was far better than that of their successors. They did not need to overwork; they
did no more than they chose to do, and yet earned what they needed." Interestingly, economic
historians have suggested that the key reason behind the English or Western European Industrial
Revolution was the relatively high labor cost. For example, Allen showed that the English wages
were high relative to the price of capital and sufficient for most people to eat bread, beef, and beer
instead of subsistence-level food (see Chapter 9).24
Thus capitalist economic growth and industrialization, at least at the beginning, have some clear
negative impact on the working class. Even today, we can still see traces of this early damage
through the relentless Malthusian population theory. Naturally, the working class in response
launched the early waves of struggles towards decent work and related radical goals.
As workers often viewed machines as the source of their misery, one of the early forms of labor
struggle, the Luddite movement, was a fight against machines. The working people also started
organizing trade unions. In response, the government brought out the Combination Acts, which
prohibited trade unions and collective bargaining. As E.P. Thompson noted, the Act caused much
resistance and unwittingly brought the revolutionary tradition into association with the then illegal
unions.25 In the era of the Industrial Revolution, there also emerged a new school of thought,
known as Utopian Socialism, which aimed to provide plans for a better society. This group of
thinkers emphasizes the need for full employment, economic democracy, and social equality,
which is now incorporated into the decent work goal. The efforts of building a socialist society via
new experimental communities largely failed, but the working class did gain some solid progress
in improving their overall conditions, including better living conditions and a shorter working day
since the second half of the 19th century.
Indeed, the achievements that the Western European and American working class made towards
the end of the 19th century were remarkable. Trade unions gained legal status in Britain in 1871,
in France in 1884, and in Germany in 1890. Social democracy saw increasing influence and the
German workers' Social Democratic Party became the largest and most popular working-class
party at the time. Political representation of the workers also expanded so that many (male)
23
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European workers and African American workers became eligible to vote. As a consequence,
workers' material conditions greatly improved. The average US annual working hours, for
example, declined dramatically from 3096 hours in 1870 to 2136 in 1929, and declined further in
the post-war era.26 The historical data suggest that the British workers' real wage fell behind output
growth in the early decades of the Industrial Revolution, but it started to catch up with output
growth later. Output per worker rose by 46 percent between 1780 and 1840 when the real wage
rose by only 12 percent; between 1840 and 1900, output per worker increased by 90 percent and
the real wage by 123 percent.27 At the same time, there was much progress in public health which
mainly affected the working people. For example, infectious disease mortality in the US declined
rapidly after measures such as clean drinking water became available. 28 All these factors
contributed to the rise in human stature and life expectancy in rich countries since the late 19th
century.29
The Russian revolution in 1917 and later the founding of the Soviet Union further strengthened
the power of the working class worldwide. The Soviet workers had guaranteed employment, and
they also enjoyed a relatively high social wage in terms of affordable housing, food, and free
healthcare, and free education. The Soviet women were also among the first to actively participate
in the governing of the state and the economy. At the same time, the Soviet Union achieved a very
high economic growth rate, thanks to economic planning. Between 1928 and 1975, the Gross
National Product (GNP) of the Soviet Union grew at 4.5 percent annually while the US grew at
3.1 percent.30 In terms of the Net Material Product, the official Soviet statistics indicate a 60-fold
increase during this period.31
Despite its internal problems, for a long time, the Soviet Union illustrated a possible model where
economic growth and decent work were compatible. More importantly, the Soviet Union and the
socialist bloc that subsequently formed also set a precedent for all other countries, which pressured
the competing nations in the capitalist camp to match part of what the Soviet workers received.
This factor, along with several other things, contributed to the unprecedented rise in workers'
power as well as economic growth in the major capitalist economies in the postwar years, also
known as the Golden Age.
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Growth and distribution in the Golden Age

The Golden Age between the early 1950s and early 1970s was a remarkable period in modern
history. Many of the former restraints on growth in the Third World were loosened as many
countries gained independence. The Third World for the first time started its independent
industrialization process. The Soviet Union and the greatly expanded socialist camp occupied a
large share of the world population. Within the advanced capitalist countries, economic growth
accelerated with more equal income distribution and the building of a welfare state.
Between 1870 and 1950, the US per capita GDP grew by about 1.7 percent per year. Between 1950
and 1973, the US per capita GDP grew by 2.5 percent per year. Other advanced countries followed
the same pattern, for example, per capita German GDP grew at merely 0.1 percent per year
between 1870 and 1950 but grew at 5 percent in the Golden Age. And this growth was not limited
to the most advanced economies. Egypt barely grew at all in the first half of the 20th century but
achieved a 2.8 percent annual growth rate of per capita GDP between 1950 and 1980. The whole
Africa's per capita GDP grew at 0.7 percent between 1870 and 1950, but grew at 1.7 percent
between 1950 and 1980. The socialist countries in Eastern Europe also grew more than 3 percent
in per capita GDP between 1950 and 1980, and East Asian economies like Singapore and South
Korea achieved about 5 percent growth in per capita GDP during the same period.32
At the same time, working people saw real improvements in their life. Following the example of
the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, in general, provided full employment along with
affordable education and healthcare. Among the rich capitalist countries, income distribution has
improved considerably. According to World Inequality Database, the top 10 percent share of
national income was always above 40 percent between the 1910s and 1930s in the US, but it
declined to around 35 percent in the Golden Age. 33 Several capitalist countries implemented
universal health insurance or health services. 34 Even the US, where the elites were in general
hostile to universal health coverage, started Medicare and Medicaid which covers the senior
population and low-income people. All of these developments contributed to the fast rise in life
expectancy across different countries. Between 1960 and 1980, the world average life expectancy
increased by about 10 years, and this fast progress is still unmatched by any other periods of human
history.35
What has caused the Golden Age? A useful explanation is that postwar capitalism was able to
develop certain socioeconomic institutions (social structure of accumulation, or SSA) that
32
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encouraged capital accumulation and economic growth. As Kotz observed, a decisive part of big
business in the US from the 1940s started to support collective bargaining, Keynesian policies,
and a welfare state, after the experiences of depression, intense labor conflicts, and wartime
mobilization.36 The Golden Age SSA had three main pillars.37 The first was the so-called capitallabor accord, a quid pro quo between the two classes that while capitalists maintained firm control
of the enterprises, (unionized) workers received stable jobs and rising incomes. The second was
the relatively stable world capitalist system dominated by the US. This enabled US capital to gain
access to cheap raw materials and intermediate goods. The last was the capital-citizen accord, as
the government increased the regulation of capital and provided comprehensive social programs.
To theorize the Golden Age experiences, some scholars argued that these conditions led to higher
wage share in the national income (and lower profit share), and the increasing aggregate demand
and capital utilization stabilized the rate of profit and capital accumulation at a relatively high
level.38
However, as the Golden Age reaches a certain point, the previous SSA that has facilitated
economic growth gradually ceased to work. For example, the increasing labor militancy and labor
share of national income started to "squeeze" the profit rate of the capitalists, which then lowered
investment and economic growth in the 1970s.39 The American hegemony started to decline, as
shown by the increasing competition from West Germany and Japan, as well as rising oil prices.
Moreover, the increasing social spending also decreased business profitability, which eventually
mobilized the big capital to stand against government regulations and social programs.40 Indeed,
the US economy, for example, entered a period of crisis between 1973 and 1979 when productivity
stagnated, and wages and rate of profit fell. 41 Similar problems emerged in other advanced
capitalist countries as well. The result was that capitalists in the leading capitalist economies
eventually started promoting neoliberal restructuring from the 1970s. And the developing
countries quickly followed suit, often due to the financial pressure from the World Bank and IMF.
The now dominant neoliberal model featured deregulation, privatization, and in general pro-capital
income distribution.
The above discussions on profit rate and capital accumulation did not apply to socialist economies.
But interestingly, the Soviet Union and much of the socialist camp also started to grow much
slower in the 1970s. For example, the CIA estimated the GNP growth rate of the Soviet Union was
still close to 5 percent throughout the 1960s, but it declined to 3 percent between 1970 and 1975,
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and further declined to 1.9 percent in the second half of that decade.42 Several possible factors
have contributed to this stagnation, including slowing technological progress, policy errors as well
as the gradual decline of labor discipline.43 And the economic stagnation eventually paved the way
for Gorbachev's reforms in the 1980s. The market-oriented reforms did not solve the existing
problems in the planning system, rather they caused an economic crisis and general chaos. Then
the Soviet elites initiated the notorious shock therapy, which quickly buried the socialist system
and introduced a free-market version of capitalism. This transition created a long-term depression
along with severe income and wealth inequality in the former Soviet republics.44 The working
people, in general, suffered a great setback as they no longer had decent wages, full employment,
as well as generous social spending under socialism. After 1990, it took the Russian people 16
years to see their real GDP restored to the 1990 level and 20 years to reach again their life
expectancy in 1990.45
Overall, since the 1980s, the neoliberal economic order prevailed not only in the Western capitalist
economies but also in the former socialist camp. And the rise of neoliberalism has posed the largest
threat to both economic growth and decent work.

Challenges in the neoliberal age

When the national governments and international agencies introduced waves of deregulation,
privatization, and pro-capital distribution since the 1980s, the belief is often that (at least
rhetorically) the neoliberal reforms will induce competition, innovation, and investment, which
lead to growth and the benefits will eventually "trickle-down.”
The actual history in the last four decades has been quite different from the more optimistic visions.
First of all, although there has been some rise in the general profit rate, that did not translate into
actual investment and growth. For example, in the US the after-tax corporate profit as a share of
GDP has more than doubled since the mid-1980s, but the net investment as a share of GDP has
declined by half. 46 Bakir and Campbell show that there was a long period of profit recovery
between 1980 and 1997, while the rate of accumulation showed a general decline.47 Indeed, the
growth rates in the neoliberal era are generally lower than the Golden Age numbers. The rich
countries, in general, saw some dramatic decrease in their growth rates. German per capita GDP
42
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used to grow 5 percent in the Golden Age, but only grew 1.6 percent annually between 1973 and
2008. The African per capita GDP grew 1.8 percent every year between 1950 and 1980, but the
growth rate shrank to 0.5 percent between 1980 and 2008. Not to mention the former socialist
camp where almost all countries went into a long depression since their capitalist transition.48
There are different explanations for such tendencies of stagnation. Some scholars focus on the
supply side, particularly the lack of great technological breakthroughs, while others emphasize the
lack of effective demand.49 These views, however, fail to recognize the inherent crisis tendency in
capitalism itself. As discussed at the beginning, economic growth is largely dependent on the way
that the ruling classes utilizes the economic surplus in a country. Measured by the Baran ratio,
there was a fast and steady decline of Baran ratios among a large number of economies since the
1980s.50 For example, the US used to spend about 70 percent of its economic surplus on capital
accumulation during the Golden Age, but only spends about 40 percent on capital accumulation
now. Where do capitalists spend their surplus if not on capital accumulation? They can "waste"
the economic surplus on several things such as wars, sales, as well as finance (interest payments,
dividends, buybacks, etc.) thanks to deregulation and financialization.51 There are exceptions in
the neoliberal age. For example, China and India have consistently spent a large share of their
economic surpluses on investment, which served as the basis of their rapid economic growth in
the last decades.52 But overall, it is fair to conclude the world as a whole faces serious growth
issues.
At the same time, the global working class is facing some serious challenges. The income
distribution became much worse than previously regardless of the income levels. In the US, the
top 10 percent share of national income increased from about 34 percent in the 1970s to about 45
percent in 2019. In South Africa, the same ratio rose from about 46 percent in the late 1980s to
about 65 percent in 2014. In India, the ratio increased from about 31 percent in 1980 to about 56
percent in the 2010s.53 From the perspective of functional distribution, the labor shares of national
income have seen dramatic declines around the globe, occurring in most countries and industries.54
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Among other things, this has to do with the increasing power of capital with deregulation,
globalization, and outsourcing.55
The rise of neoliberalism has also created a large global reserve army. In rich countries,
outsourcing has displaced and disempowered a large portion of the working class. While in the
developing countries, the neoliberal restructuring often destroyed the existing industrial base and
create a new proletariat and turn the countries into links of the capitalist world economy. This is
most evident in countries like Russia and China.56 And in many other parts of the world, the trend
of informalization or the rise of the precariat is more than clear. As Foster, McChesney and Jonna
show, "if we take categories of the unemployed, the vulnerably employed, and the economically
inactive population in prime working ages (25–54) and add them together, we come up with what
might be called the maximum size of the global reserve army in 2011: some 2.4 billion people,
compared to 1.4 billion in the active labor army."57 The huge pool of the global reserve army is
the fundamental reason for the defeat of labor worldwide.
The challenges are in other aspects as well. For example, female labor force participation has seen
a steady decline. Different from the previous increasing trend, the global female labor force
participation rate has decreased from 51 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 2019.58 A large part of
this decline was due to declining female labor participation in China and India. But such a pattern
also exists in countries such as the United States and Russia. As another example, trade unions
have suffered greatly during the neoliberal era. When Reagan and Thatcher started their neoliberal
programs, they started by defeating the unions. Most advanced capitalist countries had at least a
moderate decline of union density since the 1980s.59
In a nutshell, both the question of economic growth and the struggle for decent work remains
highly relevant today, as most of the world population are not getting either of those. This is further
complicated by the increasing concern of global warming and climate change because economic
growth is usually associated with increased carbon emissions. The next section discusses job
creation potentials with investments in a clean, green energy programme and the various aspects
of those newly created jobs.
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The prospect of green growth and decent work
A substantial section of the population, primarily located in developing countries, is still deprived
of access to basic energy infrastructures like electricity and clean cooking fuels. Increased
investments for a green economy, including energy transition from fossil fuels to renewables and
improving energy efficiency, help the economies grow and generate more jobs. It is in line with
the SDG 8 that promotes "sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and
productive employment and decent work for all.” A transition away from the fossil fuel industry
to a more clean, green economy helps the global economy move closer to full and productive
employment — a target of SDG 8. However, due to the underlying economic conditions discussed
above, it does not necessarily ensure that these jobs are "decent work for all women and men,
including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value.”
The United Nation’s goal is to achieve these targets by 2030.
Notwithstanding these ambitious targets, the task became increasingly daunting with the ongoing
pandemic of COVID-19. As discussed earlier, before the pandemic itself, economic growth slowed
down, with the global economy’s real GDP growth rate declining from 3.0 percent in 2018 to 2.3
percent in 2019. With the pandemic spreading globally, the global economy faces the worst
economic crisis since the Great Depression, with the real GDP estimated to decline by 4.2 percent
in 2020.60 The emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) are worse impacted — the
per capita GDP levels are projected to be lower in 2022 than in 2019 for almost two-thirds of these
economies.61 Such economic contraction levels have profound implications for the labour market,
especially the informal and unorganized sectors, where almost more than 1.6 billion workers are
at the risk of losing their livelihoods. In this current context, the discussions on green growth and
generation of more jobs and decent work add further relevance.
With the soaring oil prices during the first oil crisis and the growing concern over the natural
“limits to growth,” the decades of the 1970s saw environmentalism gaining ground in the
mainstream discourse. In 1972, the United Nations conference of the environment, where the
Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan for the Human Environment and several other
environment-related resolutions were adopted, was the first world conference to make the
environment a significant issue. “Sustainable development,” defined as the “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs” became the buzzword.62 Interestingly, the concept of sustainable development did not
imply absolute limits but limits imposed by the existing technology, the social organization on
environmental resources, and absorbing the effects of human activity by the biosphere. Hence,
green growth turned out to be a key strategy to achieve the goal of sustainable development. In
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March 2005, in Seoul, South Korea, at the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environmental and
Development (MCED), 52 governments and other stakeholders from Asia and the Pacific agreed
to pursue a “green growth” path. This approach sought to harmonize economic growth with
environmental sustainability while improving the eco-efficiency of economic growth and
enhancing the synergies between the environment and economy.
Investments to build a clean energy, green economy will be a source of new jobs (see Chapter 7).
However, the more relevant question is how many jobs are likely to be created? And, more
importantly, what are the quality of those jobs? Will they be good jobs in terms of wages, benefits,
and workplace conditions? What policies need to be formulated and enacted to make those jobs
more inclusive in terms of race and gender? To date, the deprived and marginalized sections in the
society are underrepresented in the energy sector jobs, except where those jobs involve activities
that are considered hazardous. 63 These questions also assume a special significance globally,
especially in developing countries, where the working class is more informal and contractual.
The job-creating potential from investments in a clean, green energy program depends on: (a) the
labour intensity of the technology and (b) the utilization of domestic resources versus relying on
domestic imports.64 The former is relatively much higher in the renewable energy sector than fossil
fuels — it is true both in the advanced, industrialized countries and the developing countries.
Recent research on the United States economy shows that renewable energy creates 7.49 full-timeequivalent (FTE) jobs per $1 million of spending, energy efficiency creates 7.72 FTE jobs per
million dollars, and fossil fuels create only 2.65 FTE jobs per $1 million spending.65 Assuming the
U.S. economy continues production at existing domestic content levels, some other recent
estimates show that the direct (like producing and installing solar panels) plus indirect jobs (i.e.,
jobs along the supply chain) are at 5.9 jobs per $1 million in spending for clean renewables relative
to 4.4 jobs in the fossil fuels industry. Adding the induced jobs in the economy brings the job
numbers to 10.2 jobs per $1 million in spending for renewables versus 8.5 jobs in fossil fuels.66
This study also shows that the full set of investments to achieve a net-zero emissions U.S. economy
by 2050 will generate about 2.5 million jobs per year, considering jobs created through direct and
indirect channels only. Over 4 million jobs per year will be generated if jobs generated through
induced channels are also included. For other developed countries like Germany, estimates show
that the economy can generate employment between 500 to 600 thousand jobs through large
investments into renewable energy (RE), which in terms of net employment will reach around 150
thousand jobs in 2030.67 Studies focusing on other European economies like the Dutch economy
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show that the transition to renewable energy would positively impact the economy by creating
almost 50,000 jobs by 2030 and adding nearly 1 percent to the gross domestic product.68
Analysis for the developing countries also portrays a similar picture regarding the potential of
creating jobs in the renewable energy sector vis-à-vis the fossil fuel sector. This question assumes
greater significance in the context of developing countries, especially for two reasons. First, with
the developing economies projected to grow in the future, there will be an increasing demand for
energy to support these growing economic activities.69 It would become pertinent for sustainability
to determine which path these economies choose — expanding the existing fossil fuel
infrastructures or redirecting the economy towards a more sustainable, clean, renewable energy
programme.70 Secondly, as discussed earlier, some of these developing countries' recent growth
experiences have shown that it was a lopsided growth, which failed to absorb the labour force in
these economies and accentuated inequality. Therefore, it becomes essential to determine whether
the path towards sustainability would further add to that bias.71 Fortunately, most research points
to the fact that the potential to generate jobs is immense when it comes to clean, renewable energy.
In India, for example, the clean energy program can generate almost 271 jobs compared to the
129.1 jobs generated per million dollars of investment in the fossil fuel industry, which is an
increase of 109.8 percent.72 Another study shows that Indonesia and South Africa would generate
about 100 jobs and 70 jobs, respectively, by spending a similar amount on the clean energy
programme.73 For these two countries, net employment gains from the clean energy program are
substantial and can be a net positive source of job creation. A similar exercise in China shows that
spending a million dollars within the three categories of renewable energy sectors — solar, wind,
and bioenergy — would generate almost 162.3 jobs compared to 96.7 jobs in the fossil fuel
sector.74 It generates almost twice as many jobs per dollar of expenditure than an equal amount of
fossil fuel spending. Another study based on CGE modeling in China shows that 1TWh expansion
of solar P.V. and wind power would create up to 45.1 thousand and 15.8 thousand direct and
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indirect jobs, respectively.75 Even in the Middle East, renewable sources of power generation,
which is projected to be almost 60 percent by 2050, could generate about 180,000 direct jobs,
which comes down to 155,000 direct jobs with more conservative assumptions on the domestic
content. Indirect jobs across the supply chain account for almost 115,000 additional jobs.76 Hence,
most studies point to the massive job-generating potential of investments in the clean, green energy
programme with the real-world experience to date indicating in the same direction.
According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the total jobs added in the
renewable energy sector reached 11.5 million globally in 2019, led by solar P.V. generating some
3.8 million jobs, or a third of the total.77 Currently, China is leading the globe accounting for more
than 4.3 million jobs. The study also reports that 63 percent of all renewable jobs in 2019 were
recorded in Asia. Many such jobs are in the agricultural supply chain due to biofuels' increasing
use, particularly in countries like Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the United States,
over 2015-2019, the renewable energy sector added 177,000 jobs, which currently brings the total
employment in the sector to 799,000 jobs.78 However, according to IRENA, the number for the
USA stands marginally low at 756,000 jobs.79 The energy efficiency sector employed 2.38 million
people in the design, installation, and manufacture of energy efficiency products and services.80
These numbers show that the clean, green energy programme is also turning out to be an effective
job-generating program across the globe. Notwithstanding the good job numbers, some genuine
concerns about these jobs' inclusive quality in terms of the demographical composition and also
the job quality in terms of benefits like pension, healthcare, and other social benefits have been
raised. They are worth addressing in the next section.

The Demographics and Quality of Employment in the Clean Energy Sector
The energy sector jobs — a heavily gender-biased industry — are biased more towards men, and
women are globally underrepresented in this industry. On average, women represent only 22
percent of full-time employees in the oil and gas industry. 81 Only 20 percent of oil and gas
extraction employees in the United States were women in 2013, while the number was 27 percent
in Canada in 2006. In the coal industry, women's employment was much lower at about 9 percent
75
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in the United States in 2013 and 12 percent in Canada in 2006.82 The bias is starker in the case of
a developing country like India. Based on the National Sample Survey Office's (NSSO's) periodic
labour force survey (PLFS), women’s share in total employment in coal is less than 5 percent. In
the oil and gas extraction industry, their share is less than 1 percent.
The history of women, especially in coal mining, portrays a picture of masculinization of work
and labor sites by implementation of protective laws. It coincided with the “de-labourization” of
women since the eighteenth century and was also concomitant with developing a social welfare
system in the European countries. However, this did not percolate to the global south due to an
increased informalization of the labour market. In essence, “on a longer term global scale, women
were evicted from mining for a period of 150 to 200 years, to reappear in the present era, mainly
in the Global South, but in the worst and most precarious conditions.”.83 It is not a coincidence.
The low representation of female employment in the fossil fuel sector also coincides with the
concept of petro-masculinity — a relationship that exists both technically and affectively,
ideationally and materially between the fossil fuel sector, and white masculinity.84
In comparison, the share of jobs for women in the renewable energy sector is better. Based on a
survey, IRENA found that the percentage of women in the renewable energy workforce has
recently increased to 32 percent.85 According to other estimates, the share of female jobs in the
clean, renewable sector for the US economy is around 21 percent.86 Even for a developing country
like India, the female representation in the renewable energy sector is about 19.0 percent.87 Despite
these promising numbers, much more needs to be done to make these jobs more inclusive. It
requires a much broader initiative to formulate more socially progressive pro-women policies to
increase these proportions further and promote women employees into more managerial and
executive roles.88 Zambia's energy policy can be an example that identifies gender as a primary
component in energy access programmes and promotes women as active energy providers and
entrepreneurs.89 As Baruah notes, "women can gain optimal traction from RE(renewable energy)
initiatives only within the context of wider socially progressive pro-women policies, as well as
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more transformative shifts in societal attitudes about gender roles. This is as true for developing
countries and emerging economies as it is for industrialized nations”.90
A related aspect that prevents gender participation in these renewable energy jobs is the lack of
skills and gender-specific training opportunities (see Chapter 5). 41 percent of respondents from
the IRENA survey cited lack of gender-specific training opportunities as a barrier to their entry
into this labour market.91 These skill shortages could impede the process of inclusive transition,
which targets to ensure equal opportunities for women, youth, and the marginalized. A primary
survey designed to understand the skill gap for the Asian developing countries – India, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka, and Vietnam — finds that reconsidering and replanning current skill levels are
imperative to accommodate green growth policies in these countries.92 The study further observes
that the skill development policies targeted at green jobs to be more compelling need to be part of
a comprehensive national development plan, accompanied by purposive advocacy and adequate
awareness plans. The problem is also real for the energy efficiency sector, even in European
countries, where vocational education and training (VET) can play a transformative role in
reducing carbon emissions and improving the buildings' energy efficiency.93 These challenges are
also evident in individual renewable energy industries like solar. Research points out a mismatch
in the skill set due to what the industry demands and the education system offer. This crisis is more
severe in developing countries than in developed ones.94
The developing countries also have an added problem which is comparatively less in the advanced
countries – the informal, unorganized labour market. Unlike the fossil fuel sector, the jobs
generated in the renewable energy sector are placed more in the informal labour market than the
formal ones. In India, almost 54 percent of the green jobs are in the unorganized sector, which is
much higher than the 12.2 percent in the fossil fuel sector.95 Employers in India have a significant
tendency to hire workers as contractors. Then, the workers are not subjected to the same labor
standards as provided by the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.96 More than 70 percent of the jobs
in China's renewable energy sectors are estimated to be in the informal economy.97 In Indonesia,
the proportion of self-employed in total employment, which is usually reflective of the
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unorganized sector, is more than 60 percent. It is as high as 91 percent in bioenergy, compared to
only 22 percent in oil and natural gas. 98 The story is similar for jobs with benefits. Even in
advanced countries like the USA, around 76 percent of workers employed in the fossil fuel-based
sectors have health insurance, compared to 57 percent in the clean renewables. So, the trends are,
in fact, clear. The informal job numbers or jobs without benefits go up with green employment
relative to the fossil fuel sector until proper policies are formulated and enforced to ensure that
these jobs are formalized with benefits and labour contracts. Examples from Bangladesh show that
if policies are properly framed and implemented in the green energy program, it significantly
improves the poor's livelihoods, especially the youth and women in the unorganized sector.99
In the long-run, building a clean energy economy globally, instead of expanding the existing fossilfuel-dominated energy system, will generate both significant opportunities and challenges for the
economies in terms of the employment effects. The opportunities exist since there will be an
overall net gain of employment by expanding the clean energy program. The challenges will be to
encourage and support these workplaces to become increasingly organized and formalized. This
expanding workforce should benefit from better quality jobs, higher and stable earnings, and other
employment benefits like health insurance, pension, the right to form unions, and enhanced social
security. Additionally, this transition process should also ensure inclusivity in gender, race, and
other marginalized section of the society. Otherwise, this program's significant objective — a
better livelihood for the workforce, as highlighted in SDG8, gets defeated. An organized workforce
will, in turn, allow for higher productivity, higher earnings, and, thereby, a more rapidly growing
clean energy sector for the global economy.

A Just Transition Programme
One cost of this transition away from the fossil fuel sector to the clean energy program is that the
fossil fuel sector businesses might have to bear the brunt of this transition unless they transit to a
cleaner, greener form of energy. Generally, the workers, primarily the aged and those at the lower
end of the earnings distribution, bear the significant chunk of this brunt during a firm closure.100
This transition, then, might be alarming in the current economic context. As discussed earlier,
when the levels of inequality are already at historically unprecedented levels, both within and
across the nation-state’s geographical boundaries, it would be unfair for policymakers to burden
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the workers with further cost of this energy transition.101 In the recent past, the popularity of
Donald Trump in the USA or Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil among the coal miners for promising to
protect their jobs is an example of how the workers can be swayed away from environmental
concerns once their livelihoods concerns are not adequately addressed. Hence, a strategy to protect
the workers’ interest in the fossil fuel industry also needs to be in place while pushing the energy
transition agenda.
According to IRENA's REmap Case (a global roadmap to increase the share of renewable energy
to 60 percent or more for a country's total final energy consumption (TFEC)), the fossil fuel
industry would lose more than 7.4 million jobs globally by 2050.102 As discussed earlier, the same
report suggests that more than 19.0 million jobs would be created in the clean, green energy
program for a net gain of 11.6 million jobs. Nonetheless, the concern remains how those 7.4 million
people losing their jobs can be reabsorbed back in the workforce to ensure a just transition. Along
with the oil and gas extraction jobs and coal mining jobs, other ancillary industries will also get
impacted in the process, and workers might lose their jobs. In the United States itself, the total
number of direct employment in all the fossil fuel-related industries, including the ancillary
industries, is at 2.5 million as of 2018, i.e., 1.7 percent of the U.S. labour force. Among all these
industries, the largest employment source was gas stations, with 765,718 total employment, more
than 30 percent of total employment, followed by oil and gas extraction with 636,449 jobs.103
The plan for the path to just transition should cover the fossil fuel workers and communities on
three grounds: (a) protecting the income of the workers for a specific time frame (possibly five
years), retraining and relocation support for the workers, (b) guaranteeing the pension of the fossil
fuel workers who would be retiring, and (c) a program to support the fossil-fuel dependent
communities. In the United States, this program would cost around $600 million per year for a
twenty-year goal of achieving a 40 percent decline in emissions.104 To reach a net-zero carbon
economy by 2050, the cost estimate through government programs to support the fossil fuel
workers in a more inclusive program is on an average more than $3.0 billion per year, at a total
cost of 100.8 billion dollars.105 Along with these expenses, what is also required is a much broader
legal geography 'JUST' framework approach.106 This framework identifies "what justice is needed
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and/or expected" by paying attention to various justice forms at a spatial scale
(national/provincial/state, and or local) and over time (long-term, medium-term, short-term).
The importance of local communities' involvement also helps bring synergy between the just
transition and environmental justice by active engagement and participation of all sections of the
community — those who have already suffered due to the "dirty industry" should not suffer more
during this transition.107 The governments and policymakers across the world should see the just
transition as an opportunity to align both the climate change goals and improve social justice and
equality in these local economies and communities, thereby taking into account both the
distributive and procedural justice.108 In this context, the experience of the transition movement in
Hunter Valley, in New South Wales, Australia, shows that "successful collaboration draws from
local knowledge and skills to create a compelling vision that addresses local aspirations and deals
with structural inequality and disadvantage".109 Notwithstanding the dominant political and power
dynamics in our society, policymakers should strive to democratize the process as much as
possible. They should frame evidence-based policies that positively influence the decarbonization
process by explicitly keeping in mind the affected population and ensuring strong sustainability.110
This dominance of the political dynamics is valid within an economy's geographical boundaries
and across borders, reflecting the significance of justice and equity concerns in the context of
global decarbonization and transition to a greener economy.111

Concluding remarks
This chapter reviews the concepts of economic growth and decent work in a historical context.
Capitalism created the condition for economic growth that we know in the last two centuries. The
struggle for decent work has also originated in capitalism, and the working class has made great
progress since the late 19th century. The Golden Age was a unique period when many countries
have succeeded in pursuing both economic growth and decent work. But the later rise of
neoliberalism has damaged those achievements, and we are living in a period of global stagnation
and increasing inequality.
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Considering the urgency of climate change and global warming, any new proposal of economic
growth needs to be based on green economy/clean energy. It also needs to consider the global labor
division, environmental justice, and the quality of work.
Historically, the advanced industrialized countries formed a significant chunk of the fossil fuel
users and the globe’s primary carbon emitters. These countries were major importers of oil and
gas. For instance, the total U.S. annual primary energy net imports generally increased in most
years since the mid-1950s. They reached a record high in 2005, which was equal to about 30
percent of total U.S. energy consumption. Since 2005, the trends started reversing, and it
eventually culminated in 2019, when the United States became a net total energy exporter for the
first time since 1952.112 Among the several factors, one important factor contributing to the lower
dependence on fossil fuel within the US during this period was relocating the production process
to the global south, especially in China, Vietnam, and other South Asian countries. With the poorer
countries becoming the global production houses, the need for energy to produce commodities
within the United States’ geographical boundaries started to decline. Hence, in the process, the
developing countries became major carbon emitters, and their share in the global emissions
increased. Therefore, while accounting for the global energy transition, a just approach should
consider the current per capita level of emissions (the flow) and account for the advanced
countries’ level of carbon emitted historically (stocks) and their energy dependence. Nonetheless,
to accelerate the just transition process at the global level, the countries that continue to emit carbon
should make financial transfers to net absorbers of carbon.113 The developed countries need to play
a more prominent role in this since any successful execution of this energy transition at a global
scale will require “a communicated and well-coordinated strategy, with close cooperation within
and between countries.”114
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